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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the bailor' to assume risks of loss that might occur by means other

than the negligence of the bailee. The bailee is placed by the contract in the identical position as regards loss or damage due to his
negligence that he would occupy in the absence of an express contract. The tenor of Article X, as a whole, does not excuse the bailee
of any liability for negligence. Consequently, the dissenting opinion
seems to reflect the sounder view.
J. A. WILLIAMS.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Fixing Liability of
Stockholders in Insolvent State Banks
The procedure by which the statutory liability of stockholders in
insolvent banking corporations could best be enforced has been a
problem in North Carolina. Prior to 1927 no assessment could be
made against such stockholders until the value of the banks' assets
in proportion to its debts had been ascertained.' This requirement
often resulted in long and expensive litigation, and made it difficult
in many cases for the receiver to enforce liability. To remedy this
situation the legislature enacted section 13, .chapter 113, Public Laws
of 1927.2
This statute first came before the North Carolina Court in Corporation Commission v. Murphey.3 The defendant in the case was a
stockholder inwan insolvent bank, and had failed to pay the "levy"
docketed in clerk's office of the Superior Court by the Corporation
'Corporation Commission v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 193 N. C. 113,
136 S. E. 362 (1927) ; Corporation Commission v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,
192 N. C. 366, 135 S. E. 48 (1926) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §239.
'"After the expiration of thirty days from the date of the filing of the
notice of the taking of possession of any bank, in the office of the clerk of the
Superior Court, the Corporation Commission may levy an assessment equal
to the stock liability of each stockholder in the bank, and shall file a copy of
such levy in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court, which shall be recorded and indexed as judgments, and shall have the force and effect of a
judgment of the Superior Courts of this state; and the same shall become due
and payable immediately, and if not paid execution may at the instance of the
Corporation Commission issue against the stockholder delinquent, and actions
on said assessments may be instituted against any non-resident stockholders
in the same manner as other actions against non-residents of the state. Any
stockholder may appeal to the Superior Court from the levy of assessment;
the issue raised by the appeal may be determined as other actions in the
Superior Court. At any time before the determination of said appeal such stockholder may petition the resident or presiding judge to relieve his property of
the lien, pending the determination of the question raised by said appeal; and
such relief may be granted in the discretion of the judge hearing the petition
and upon such terms as he may fix." N. C. Code (Michie 1927) §218c (13).
' 197 N. C. 42, 147 S. E. 667 (1929) ; affirmed 50 Sup. Ct. 161 (1930).
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Commission in accordance with the statute. The defendant later
entered special appearance in a proceeding by the Corporation Commission for the liquidation of the bank and moved for a judgment
declaring the "levy" void and enjoining enforcement thereof, on the
grounds that the statute was contrary to the due process clauses of
the state 4 and federal constitutions. 5 The statute was held constitutional, the court construing the act of the Corporation Commission
in filing the stockholder's name and the amount due on his stock with
the clerk of the Superior Court to be an assessment, and that the
right to trial de nova on appeal from the assessment to the Superior
Court constituted due process of law.
The essential elements of due process of law in questions of procedure are notice and opportunity to be heard,0 before a tribunal having jurisdiction,7 at any time prior to rendition of final judgment. 8
If these elements are present the proceedings will be declared constitutional. The due process clause does not guarantee any particular
form of procedure in state tribunals, being concerned with the substance and not the form of such procedureO
The statute in question 0 specifically provides that the Corporation Commission "shall file a copy of such levy in the office of the
clerk of the Superior Court, which * * * shall have the force and
*North Carolina Constitution, Art. 1, §17.
United States Constitution, 14th Amendment.
'Drainage Commissioners v. Mitchell, 170 N. C. 324, 87 S: E. 112 (1915);
State v. Collins, 169 N. C. 323, 84 S. E. 1049 (1915) ; City of Kinston v. Loftin,
149 N. C. 255, 62 S. E. 1069 (1908) ; Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co., 133 N. C.
478, 45 S. E. 768, 98 Am. St. Rep. 718 (1903); Rusk v. Thompson, 170 Mo.
App. 76, 156 S. W. 64 (1913); Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429, 16 N. E.
826, 5 Am. St. Rep. 637 (1888); Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 30 Ain. Rep.
289 (1878) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 332, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L. ed.
254, 27 A. L. R. 375 (1921) ; Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 16
Sup. Ct. 344, 40 L. ed. 467 (1896); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24
L. ed. 616 (1877). "A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state,
unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to
give him knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard," American Law Institute, Restatement, Conflict of Laws
(1926) §80.
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877) ; Charles v. City of
Marion, 98 Fed. 166 (C. C. D. Ind. 1899) ; Garvin v. Daussman, supra note 6.
'Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C. 199, 203, 59 S. E. 653
(1907): Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 415. 22 Sup. Ct. 384, 46 L. ed.
612 (1902) ; Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300, 307, 22 Sup. Ct. 162, 46 L. ed.
207 (1902).
Parish v. East Coast Cedar Co., supra note 6; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz T.
North, 271 U. S. 40, 46 Sup. Ct. 384, 70 L. ed. 818 (1926) ; Simon v. Craft,
182 U. S. 427, 21 Sup. Ct. 836, 45 L. ed. 1165 (1901).
" Supra note 2.
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effect of a judgment of the Superior Courts * * * and if not paid,
execution may at the instance of the Corporation Commission issue
against the stockholder." An execution is a judicial writ issuing
from the court where the judgment is rendered."1 Every execution
presupposes a judgment of some sort, and the right given to issue the
one implies the existence of the other.' 2 Therefore the "levy" provided for in the statute is a judgment issuing from the Corporation
Commission, a quasi-judicial body. 13 It is not a mere assessment.
The language of the legislature in the statute says that the "levy"
shall be recorded as a judgment, and "shall have the force and effect
of a judgment of the Superior Courts." The judgment is final 14 to
the extent that if the defendant does not appeal he is subject to execution' r against his property.
A total want of jurisdiction over the person or thing to be affected
by a judgment renders the judgment void, and the proceedings in
which it was obtained are obnoxious to the constitutional guaranty
of due process of law. 16 When a proceeding is strictly in personam,
brought to determine the personal obligations of the parties, personal
service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the cause is
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction.' 7 Where a defendant has
never been served with process, nor appeared voluntarily, a judgment
against him is not simply voidable, but void, and may be so treated
whenever and wherever offered, without any direct proceeding to
'Gooch v. Gregory, 65 N. C. 142 (1871).
"Sheppard v. Bland, 87 N. C. 163, 167 (1882).
"N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1023.
""A judgment is final which decides the case upon its merits, without any
reservation for other and future directions of the court, so that it is not necessary to bring the case again before the court," Sanders v. May, 173 N. C.
47, 91 S. E. 526 (1917) ; Bunker v. Bunker, 140 N. C. 18, 52 S. E. 237 (1905).
""An execution is the writ which directs and authorizes an officer to carry
into effect the final judgment or decree of a court," Raulerson v. Peeples, 81
Fla. 206, 87 So. 629 (1920).
"The writs of attachment and execution are
essentially different, the former is issued for the purpose of seizing property
and holding same in order that, if a judgment should be obtained, the property
thus seized will be forthcoming to satisfy said judgment, while the latter is a
writ issued for the purpose of enforcing a judgment that has been obtained,"
Mount v. Trammel, 73 Okl. 96, 175 Pac. 232 (1918).
" Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
' T Johnson v. Whilden, 166 N. C. 104, 81 S. E. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1916 C. 783
(1914), affirmed 171 N. C. 153, 88 S. E. 223, 225 (1916); Vick v. Flournoy,
147 N. C. 209, 60 S. E. 978 (1908); Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N. C. 700, 24
S. E. 527, 36 L. R. A. 402 (1896) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed.

565 (1877).
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vacate it.18 The only notice given the defendant under the statute
in question, before judgment was entered, was the filing of notice
with the clerk of the Superior Court that the Corporation Commission had taken over the insolvent bank. 19 This was not a personal
service, nor was there a voluntary appearance by the defendant or
20
his attorney.
If the interpretation placed upon the statute by the court, that the
levy was an assessment only, was correct, then the decision of the
court upon the constitutionality of the statute was also correct. 21
An assessment is usually considered in the nature of a tax, to be enforced against the specific property assessed, and not enforced against
the property owner personally. 22 When a stockholder in a corporation is assessed on his stock and fails to pay, the proceeding is to
sell the stock for the debt, and if the income from the sale does not
cover the assessment, the balance is recovered by instituting a personal action against the stockholder. 23 The assessment as construed
under the statute in question was not against property, but against
the defendant personally, and was to be collected from his property
generally by execution. There would seem to be some question as to
"Johnson v. Whilden, supra note 17; Condry v. Cheshire, 88 N. C. 375
(1883) ; Doyle v. Brown, 72 N. C. 393 (1875) ; Stalling v. Gully, 48 N. C. 344
(1856).
" See Statute, supra note 2.
'The question arises as to the operation of the statute on non-resident
stockholders. The art provides "and actions on said assessments may be instituted against any non-resident stockholders in the same manner as other
actions against non-residents of the state." A personal judgment against a
non-resident rendered without personal jurisdiction over him is void. FREEMAN
on JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) p. 2825. Property within the state belonging to
non-residents cannot be reached and applied to the satisfaction of their creditors except by -proceedings substantially in ren.

FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS

(5th ed. 1925) p. 2839. The procedure under the statute is not explained, but
it would seem to provide for notice by publication to non-resident stockholders, and an action begun in Superior Court. Such a proceeding in personam
against a non-resident stockholder is clearly without jurisdiction, and the
statute seems to apply only to attachment which was available before the act
was passed.
"It was admitted by the defendant's attorney on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court that if the interpretation of the North Carolina Court
was correct, its decision was also correct. Upon this admission the United
States Court refused to hear further arguments in the case. Raleigh (N. C.)
News and Observer, January 25, 1930, page 1, col. 4; United States Daily,
January 27, 1930, page 11, col. 7.
'See generally, Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32. 14 S. E. 521, 17 A. L. R.
330 (1892) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §§2710-2717.
2Elizabeth
City Cotton Mills v. Dunstan, 121 N. C. 12. 27 S. E. 1001, 61
Am. St. Rep. 654 (1897) ; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1165.
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'whether for such personal liability he had had a sufficient day in
court to comply with the rule of due process.
If the levy is a judgment and therefore void, the privilege of appeal given by the statute cannot cure the defect.
A. W. GHOLSON,

JR.

Contracts-Anticipatory Breach-Mailing of Letter as Test
of Time and Place of Repudiation
Before the time for delivery under a contract of sale, the buyer
in Kansas wrote and mailed a notice of repudiation to the seller in
-Ohio. Held: that the renunciation constituted a breach when and
'where the letter was posted.I
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, which is well
,established,2 allows the aggrieved party an option of remedies, 3 but
there is an immediate duty to mitigate damages. 4 Although the anticipatory breach gives rise to a present cause of action, 5 the party
'in default may withdraw his repudiation, and thus revive the previ-ous contractual relations, provided the breach has not been accepted,
.or has not caused the innocent party to change his position.6
1

Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F (2d) 822
(C. C. A. 6th, 1929). The question of where the breach occurred was decided
in order to determine where the cause of action arose so that the proper statute
of limitations could be applied.
2 Where a party to an executory contract repudiates his obligations before
the time for performance, the opposite party may immediately sue for damages.
Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 Ellis & Bl. 678 (1853) ; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S.
1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. ed. 953 (1900) ; Bryant v. So. Box and Lumber Co.,
192 N. C. 607, 135 S. E. 531 (1926). Contra: Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass.
530, 19 Am. Rep. 384 (1874) ; Carstens v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 858, 57 N. W. 757
(1894).
' He may bring an action for damages before performance is due, await the
actual breach, or rescind the agreement. United Press Ass'n v. National
Newspaper Ass'n, 237 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 8th., 1916).
"Although the injured party chooses to keep the contract alive, he will not
be awarded damages he could have prevented, after notice of the repudiation.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §1298; Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed.
486 (C. C. A. 8th., 1899) ; Davis v. Bronson, 2 N. D. 300, 50 N. W. 836, 16 L.
R. A. 655 (1891). Contra: Roebling's Sons Co. v. Lock Stitch Fence Co., 130
Ill. 660, 22 N. E. 518 (1789) ; McAlister v. Safley, 65 Ia. 719, 23 N. W. 139
(1885); Michael v. Hart, [1902] 1 K. B. 482.

'Supra note 2.

Void, Withdrawal of Repudiation after Anticipatory Breach of Contract
(1926) 5 TEX. L. R.. 9; Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. St. 541 (1881) ; Swiger v.
Hayman, 56 W. Va. 123, 48 S. E. 839, 107 Am. St. Rep. 899 (1904); Iowa
Mausoleum Co. v. Wright, 170 Ia. 546, 153 N. W. 94 (1915); Independent
Milling Co. v. Howe Scales Co., 105 Kan. 87, 181 Pac. 554 (1919).

